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FEATURE COMMENT: The Well-Reasoned
Case For Reversing The Outsourcing
Trend: A Review Essay Of Jon Michaels’
Constitutional Coup: Privatization’s
Threat To The American Republic
To date, few have grasped the depth, breadth,
and texture of businesslike government in its
variegated forms. (Even a … simple head count
of the number of federal service contractors has
proven alarmingly elusive.) And even fewer appreciate what’s actually going on.
Jon D. Michaels

Rethinking the Outsourcing Era—Having
experienced, professionally, the modern era of Government outsourcing, while knee-deep in Government contracting policy, practice and law, I always
welcome, and find it refreshing to read, an outsider’s
perspective on how we got here, where we lost our
bearings and what went wrong. To that end, Jon
Michaels’ thoughtful and thought-provoking new
book, Constitutional Coup: Privatization’s Threat
to the American Republic (Harvard, 2017, $35.00
in hardcover, $19.95 in Kindle© format), fully satisfied my expectations. What I wasn’t prepared for,
and what readers of The Government Contractor
may find more controversial, is Michaels’ cogent,
carefully structured, well-defended thesis, nay, his
clarion call to arms, which forcefully advocates a
full retreat.
Toiling alongside Steve Kelman in the Office of
Federal Procurement Policy during the exhilarating, change-oriented frenzy of Vice President Al
Gore’s “Reinventing Government” initiative in the
1990s, I, like many, got caught up in the moment.
4-194-405-0

We voraciously consumed, dissected and shared David Osborne and Ted Gaebler’s Reinventing Government (1993), and followed Don Kettl, John J. DiIulio,
Jr., William Eggers and other prophets of the era
who preached the gospel of the “new public management.” We were applying the best practices gleaned
from the private sector! We were change agents,
casting aside formalism, breaking the stranglehold
of an increasingly outdated civil service, embracing
the marketplace, and freeing procurement professionals from the false economy of low price. Above
all, we pounded the drum of value for money. We
were making Government efficient!
Of course, for all our fascination with businesslike Government, we didn’t start the outsourcing fire (more on that later), nor did we
extinguish it. (Indeed, as Michaels’ book reminds
us, the embers still burn bright.) Nor did we anticipate a post-millennial (largely post-9/11) explosion in federal contract (and, of course, grant)
spending, or the breathtaking speed in which the
service contracting juggernaut would eclipse conventional federal procurement of supplies (goods)
and construction (public works), as the Federal
Government systematically outsourced space,
national security, the use of force, sacrifice and,
ultimately, everything.
Two consecutive two-term presidents, Bill
Clinton and George W. Bush, favored businesslike
Government, fueling and accelerating the Government’s reliance on contractor support. Another
two-term president, Barrack Obama, initially railed
against service contracts and promised to reverse
the trend, until he quickly deemed such an effort
futile and improvident, and instead presided over
the inexorable expansion of the General Services
Administration’s self-serving commercial services
outsourcing enterprise. (Twenty-four years! Tempus
fugit! Where did the time go?)
But the spark predates that handy narrative.
In the early 1980s, inspired by Margaret Thatcher’s
privatization initiative in the United Kingdom and
unable to curtail “big federal spending and regulatory
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programs,” Ronald Reagan “laid the groundwork for the
Privatization Revolution to come.” Michaels at 95–98.
“In a generation’s time, we went from JFK’s stirring cry
for public service … to Ronald Reagan’s outright denunciation of the State: ‘Government is not the solution to
our problem, government is the problem.’ ” Id. at 87.
Pundits, legislators, and newly politicized business and religious leaders joined Reagan in railing against … the Nanny State….
But a funny thing happened on the way to the
gallows. The mob got cold feet. The torch and
pitchfork crowd realized they really, really liked
government programs—at least the ones that benefitted them directly…. What they really disliked
… was the government itself—its people, its procedures, and its institutional and organizational
architecture.

Id. at 2 (emphasis in original). With that, Reagan
pivoted to the private sector, and efficiency über alles,
privatization, Government contracting and marketizing the bureaucracy began accumulating steam, rapidly accelerating towards exit velocity.
Thirty-five years later, is it too late to ask if we
went too far? If so, is it possible to go back? Should
we? How?
These are not idle questions, and Constitutional
Coup is not a light, summer page-turner. Rather, it
is a serious academic meditation, recommending not
only that we apply the brakes to the outsourcing
train, but that the future of our nation depends on
taking a meaningful, substantive, principled, fundamental step back. Although cynics may dismiss
Michaels’ cerebral yet heartfelt ode to civil servants
(and Government service, generally), that would be
a mistake. Michaels’ Constitutional Coup cautions
us that, particularly at this unique and seemingly
anxiety-fraught moment in time, we fail to address
these important questions now at our own peril.
Pushing Back, from a Different Angle—Michaels paints a dire picture and leaves little to the
imagination. Basically he asserts,
Government cannot and ought not be run like a
business in any meaningful sense of the word….
Until that message is heard, until government’s intrinsic, albeit idiosyncratic, worth is
recognized on its own terms, American public administration will continue to look inadequate—a
sickly, inexplicably inefficient enterprise in need
of rescuing….

Id. at 231–32. Ouch.

Obviously, that is a tough place to start, and Michaels acknowledges, tracks, describes and explains
the breadth and depth of the long-standing privatization debate. On the one hand, “privatization’s
enthusiasts have long considered government agencies wasteful and government employees indolent.”
Id. at 121. Meanwhile, outsourcing’s most consistent
critics complain that, among other things, the wholesale, generational replacement of civil servants and
uniformed service members with legions of comparatively invisible contractor personnel failed to deliver
the monetary savings promised.
Both parties bemoan the dearth of meaningful
data as to “whether market actors and practices are
indeed more efficient than their bureaucratic counterparts.” Id. at 121. Another chorus laments “the
dangers of wayward contractors,” fully cognizant that
“[a]ccounts of contractor fraud, abuse, and venality
are catnip to an American public reared on gotcha
politics.” Id. Michaels even exposes the internal hypocrisy through which many are “quick to cast blame
on the agents (that is, the venal contractors) rather
than the goodly government principals who hired
them—even though privatization is often premised
… on a profound distrust of government officials and
their motives.” Id. at 128 (emphasis in original).
Of course, Michaels is not alone in trying to focus policymakers on the nature of the bureaucracy
and who populates it. New York University’s Paul
Light, who has chronicled The True Size of Government for decades, fundamentally agrees that a focus
on “debating the size of government” has caused
us to lose track of whether the right people are
empowered to implement federal policy: “What we
need is to devote more time to weighing whether
the American people are best served by a federal
employee or a contractor in each given function.” “
‘True Size’ Of Federal, Contractor Workforces Has
Remained Steady Over 30 Years, Report Says,” 59
GC ¶ 312.
Painting with a broader brush, Michaels fears
that today’s privatization norm—expansive reliance
on at-will and desperate-to-please contractors, rather
than tenured civil servants—concentrates too much
power in the hands of the executive, specifically politically appointed agency heads. More to the point,
Michaels is less worried about “greedy contractors
and anemic agency leaders,” and more anxious about
“the tandem of compliant contractors and the cagey
agency leaders that hire them.” Id. at 120. As a result,
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this “marketization … facilitat[es] more politically
(specifically, presidentially) dominated, less expert,
and overall less rivalrous administrative governance.”
Id. at 136.
In such an outsourced, privatized regime, the
Government, as envisioned by the founders, simply
cannot function. In other words, the founders injected a protective, defensive rubric into the Constitution for a reason. “Absolute power corrupts, … [and
s]overeign power … is intentionally and necessarily morally inflected and coercive…. [Conversely,]
separation of powers … prevents tyranny, promotes
liberty, and helps enrich public policy.” Id. at 6.
The Status Quo is Not the Natural Order of
Things—Presently, we have grown so accustomed
to outsourced Government that, today, our military
cannot move, fight, communicate, eat or sustain itself
without a fully integrated contractor presence. At the
same time, private-sector replacement of outdated,
often frustrating, practices with flexible vehicles offering end-user-focused innovations generated measurable results. For example, despite the tsunami of
criticism and litigation surrounding the Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program contracts, military
historians and strategists may yet celebrate that outsourcing initiative. Arguably, never has a nation-state
enjoyed such a capacity to deploy so nimbly—and to
sustain so thoroughly—its fighting force regardless of
size, distance, geography, weather or duration.
Ultimately, Michaels appropriately frets that
“what we really have is a very troubled, hollowed
out enterprise.” Id. at 201. Contractors are “running
prisons and immigration detention facilities; facilitating domestic surveillance and counterterrorism
operations; drafting major rules; shaping energy,
transportation, health care, and environmental policy; rendering public benefits; collecting taxes; and
monitoring and enforcing regulatory compliance
across the vast administrative expanse.” Id. at 3.
(See also his passage on “New Millennial (Big Tent)
Privatization,” at 105–110, describing a dizzying
array of privatized governance, including, among
others, private standard setting, deputization,
crowdsourcing, patriotic philanthropy and state
ventriloquism.) Michaels deftly reminds us that
this is a “constitutional phenomenon—weighty in
its own right and rendered all the more meaningful
and fraught” given the founding of the nation and
its evolution. Id. at 4. Whether we respect it or, for
that matter, think we understand and can control
© 2017 Thomson Reuters
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it, “the Market, at least in its pure, idealized state,
is not democratic, deliberative, or judicial.” Id. at 5.
After setting the stage, Michaels cautions that we
should not become too distracted by our history. Yes,
context matters, and we cannot ignore the nation’s
uneven and inconsistent evolution. But over time,
“the framers’ initial architecture came to be seen
as outdated. [The quaint and limited government of
our infant state] was simply not up to the twentiethcentury task of nourishing and housing the poor,
protecting workers and consumers, busting trusts,
steering monetary policy, regulating the financial
sector, stabilizing a volatile economy, and readying a
nation for war.” Id. at 7–8. Accordingly, Michaels prods
the reader to focus less on how we got here, and more
on what comes next. (Having said that, Michaels’
rollicking romp through the history of outsourcing is
a fresh, thoroughly entertaining alternative to, say,
James Nagle’s A History of Government Contracting
(2d ed. 1999), which GC readers likely would find
paints a far more conventional and familiar picture.)
Looking ahead, he poses an admittedly academic,
largely aspirational and (not just legal, but) constitutional case for a greater commitment to the civil
service. He looks to the courts—he is, after all, a law
professor—for judicial custodialism “to promote a
well-functioning administrative separation of powers,” and he implores Congress to “provide considerably more support for the currently beleaguered
and oft-marginalized civil service; increase the level
and quality of public participation in administrative
proceedings; and minimize bad-faith obstructionism.”
Michaels at 20.
Michaels encourages courts to push back against
“marketized bureaucracy,” withholding the broad deference (see generally, Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837
(1984)) agencies typically enjoy, or “simply reject[ing]
any decision, interpretation, or action that arises out
of this compromised, marketized administrative process, effectively obligating Congress to reinstate the
civil service.” Michaels at 198. Quite simply, he wants
Congress and the courts to jam every available finger
in the outsourcing dike, then lean in and push back.
An Ode to Civil Servants?—GC readers may
find Michaels’ medicine a tough pill to swallow. (And,
yes, Michaels is fully cognizant that his work could
be dismissed as “a reflexive, nostalgic reversion to the
good old days of the New Deal and Great Society.” Id.
at 143.) He suggests that “Congress impose[] an immediate moratorium on all new contracts involving
3
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the outsourcing of discretionary sovereign responsibilities.” Michaels pragmatically leaves aside nonstate “commercial jobs … for example, secretarial,
catering, gardening, clerical, IT, and janitorial work.”
He then calls upon executive “agencies [to] promptly
review all existing contracts … [and] unwind the private sector relationships and build up the necessary
in-house capacity.”
All of which requires that “Congress fully finance[], and slightly subsidize[], renationalization”
to the tune of “hir[ing] one million new government
workers” or more. Id. at 207–208. (Yup, a million
new feds! That’s not a typo.) Brushing aside the
pedestrian concerns of a fiscally constrained nation
managed (or mismanaged) by a partisan, undisciplined and budget-phobic legislature, Michaels digs
in his heels, asserting that “the costs are beside the
point. Demarketization isn’t just a good idea, …
[it’s] a constitutional imperative.” Id. at 209.
Fortunately, Michaels does not stop there, and
many steps along his suggested path toward restoring
the civil service resonate. In addition to (modestly)
increased pay for feds, Michaels makes a compelling
case for a National Government Service Academy,
along the lines of the long-accepted and generously
funded service academies at Annapolis, Colorado
Springs and West Point. (For good measure, he also
recommends creation of a civilian Government officer
training corps, a GOTC analogue to ROTC). Id. at
209–212. He makes a similar case for a mid-career
civil service leadership academy akin to the military
senior service schools (e.g., the military’s war colleges in Carlisle, Montgomery and Newport). Id. at
213–214.
Michaels gets more creative, and embraces the
private sector more proactively, to rebuild the civil
service’s reputation, by arguing that Congress expend
(massive) sums “to make plain [to the public] the
constitutional and everyday instrumental value of bureaucratic work.” Pointing to the Department of Defense’s $667 million annual advertising budget—“the
same amount as Taco Bell, Burger King, Starbucks,
and Dunkin’ Donuts spend combined”—Michaels (to
my mind, correctly) frets that the public only “hear[s]
about scandals and failure, but never the great success or … simple, small, and routine things that we
take for granted … that keep people safe and secure.”
Id. at 215–218 (emphasis in original).
No, Virginia, No One Really Reads the
Federal Register—Having spent a professional
4
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lifetime following the machinations and work product of the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council,
Civilian Agency Acquisition Council, Defense Acquisition Regulations Council, and Armed Services
Procurement Regulation Council, as well as innumerable executive agencies, I was easily persuaded
by Michaels’ lament that the Government must
also do better—much better—to engage the public,
our civil society, in maintaining the administrative
aspects of our representative democracy. And that
starts by communicating in language and through
mediums the public understands and accesses.
[M]any Americans have never heard of the
Federal Register, and most have never seen it,
let alone read it. Yet despite [its] rather limited
reach … and its almost inescapable obscurantism, judges and lawmakers hold true to the
conceit that this government publication has a
true public audience.

Id. at 220. (Conceit, indeed!) Michaels articulates
numerous pragmatic and sensible improvements,
from greater use of mainstream and social media,
to virtual community outreach (including virtual
AMAs or “ask me anything” sessions), to a rejuvenation of basic civics education. He also appreciates the
need for agencies to recommit to, and invest in, plain
language initiatives. Rather than continue to have
public notices “which seem to have been ghostwritten by the clerks staffing Little Dorrit’s Circumlocution Office,” agencies should rely on “professional,
creative, and dedicated writers.” Id. at 224–225 (with
a nod to Charles Dickens, and a helpful reminder
that this book is liberally sprinkled with sufficient
splendid historical and cultural references—what
gamers might consider Easter eggs—to maintain
the reader’s attention, even where the policy, legal
or theoretical thicket is most dense). Good ideas, all,
yet—as Michaels concedes—cumulatively, his recommendations entail efforts that would “require a lot
of money, moxie, and patience[,] nothing short of an
administrative moon shot.” Id. at 230.
Musings on Audience, Voice, Reading and
Critical Thinking—Despite the already percolating interest in Michaels’ work in administrative law
and elite legal academic circles (two admittedly niche
communities), it is reasonable to ask what audience
Michaels wrote for and, ultimately, who should—and
who will—read the book.
Michaels is an incredibly smart guy, his arguments reflect a lifetime of serious study and scholar© 2017 Thomson Reuters
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ship, and his writing exhibits not only the breadth
of his knowledge, but also his command of a rich,
colorful and expansive vocabulary. Frequent flashes
of memorable, quotable and sublime prose break up
what might otherwise be dense, impenetrable and
complex concepts presented in attention-demanding,
concentration-challenging, lengthy sentences. (Suffering from the same malady, I couldn’t help but notice
that the book’s concluding paragraph contains two
intricate, fifty-word, oxygen-depleting, eye-straining
tongue-twisters.)
But do not be too quick to bypass the book, even if
you might find it—both at a macro and micro level—
a bridge too far, a finely tuned vehicle delivering a
theoretical aspiration that might seem somewhat
divorced from the hard-won experience of successful,
attempted or even failed implementation of a Government program. (Yes, yes, many readers would be more
open to Michaels’ critique if he demonstrated more
obvious or deeper bona fides in public service or as a
contractor.) That is not the point.
Constitutional Coup offers a unique opportunity to
pause, take a step back, and look more broadly at the
fire you fight every day. Might an ounce of prevention
outweigh a pound of cure? Is this the legacy we want to
leave to those who follow in our footsteps? Where does
this contract—this task or delivery order—fit into the
story arc of accomplishing the Government’s mission
and serving the public? These questions are as important as they are timely.
Alas, reading the book probably will not make it
easier for you to do your job. And I cannot promise
that parts won’t keep you up at night. But my sense
is it would be impossible for an engaged and independent public procurement professional or policymaker—let alone an administrative law scholar—to
navigate Michaels’ analysis without questioning any
number of things we daily take for granted. That
is a good thing. It is important for all of us to think
periodically—not only about what needs to be done
and how we do our jobs—but why we do what we do.
To fully engage in Michaels’ work, most GC
readers will have to let go of any number of their
most basic (even if typically unstated) assumptions.
Fortunately, unlike Yuval Noah Harari, in his splendid work, Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind
(2015), Michaels isn’t asking you to reconsider your
preconceived notions about what it means to be human. Nor does he expect you to come to grips with
our all-too-human failings, such as irrationality,
© 2017 Thomson Reuters
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susceptibility to common illusions, overconfidence
and flawed decision-making. (You can find plenty
of that elsewhere. Consider, among others, the autobiographical Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics (2016), by the most recent Nobel
laureate, Richard H. Thaler, or, covering similar
ground, the more popular The Undoing Project: A
Friendship That Changed Our Minds (2016), by
Michael Lewis (of Moneyball, Blind Side, Big Short
and Liar’s Poker fame), or even the eye-opening
work by Christopher Chabris and Daniel Simons,
The Invisible Gorilla: How Our Intuitions Deceive
Us (2011). Or, if you are inclined towards brevity,
consider Timothy Snyder’s pint-sized, but powerful
and disturbing, On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from
the Twentieth Century (2017). But I digress.)
There is no way around it: Michaels will make
you think about outsourced Government and what the
modern era of explosive growth in service contracting
means to us as a nation, and to our future.
These Are Not Normal Times—For better or
worse, the 2016 election took place while Michaels
was putting the finishing touches on the book. A
strict publication schedule permitted Michaels to do
little more than acknowledge that President Trump
“deserves special attention … because he promises to
be a transformative president, one way or another.”
Michaels at 14.
Michaels fully acknowledges that “President Trump
continues to push a businesslike government agenda …
in ways especially easy to cast as corrupt and denounce
as dangerous.” Id. at 205. And he harbors no illusions in
recognizing that the primary impediment to his aspirations is the need for “the constitutional actors [to] act
… custodially, rather than opportunistically.” Id. at 144.
That seems particularly Pollyanna when the pervasive
“cultural malady” we watch play out each day is “a
desire on the part of elected officials to no longer work
for the public good but instead to subvert the process of
governing.” Id. at 149.
But maybe, as Michaels optimistically muses,
“Trump’s intemperate attacks on bureaucracy, his
appointment of glaringly unqualified cabinet officials
and presidential aides, and the torrent of conflicts of
interest surrounding him … may prompt even those
most dismissive of the [the original administrative
state] to give the civil service and civil society a second chance.” Id. at 205. Maybe? Why not?
Whether you agree or disagree, Constitutional
Coup identifies important issues that shape our
5
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field, our work, our profession, our Government,
our markets, our nation and, frankly, our future.
We ignore those issues at our peril. At a minimum,
Michaels opens the door for us to start a meaningful
conversation. Read the book. Then, let’s talk.

F
This Feature Comment was written for T he
Government Contractor by Steven L. Schooner,
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the Nash & Cibinic Professor of Government
Procurement Law at the George Washington
University Law School. Professor Schooner is a
Fellow of the National Contract Management Association and a Certified Professional Contracts
Manager CPCM, and he serves as a director of
the Procurement Round Table. Follow him on
Twitter @ProfSchooner.
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